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ABSTRACT
In this work, we provide an industry research view for approach-
ing the design, deployment, and operation of trustworthy Artifi-
cial Intelligence (AI) inference systems. Such systems provide cus-
tomers with timely, informed, and customized inferences to aid
their decision, while at the same time utilizing appropriate security
protection mechanisms for AI models. Additionally, such systems
should also use Privacy-Enhancing Technologies (PETs) to protect
customers’ data at any time.
To approach the subject, we start by introducing trends in AI
inference systems. We continue by elaborating on the relationship
between Intellectual Property (IP) and private data protection in
such systems. Regarding the protection mechanisms, we survey
the security and privacy building blocks instrumental in designing,
building, deploying, and operating private AI inference systems.
For example, we highlight opportunities and challenges in AI sys-
tems using trusted execution environments combined with more
recent advances in cryptographic techniques to protect data in use.
Finally, we outline areas of further development that require the
global collective attention of industry, academia, and government
researchers to sustain the operation of trustworthy AI inference
systems.
1 INTRODUCTION
At a macroscopic level, the players in the current AI and privacy
landscape are customers (including end-users), institutions, and
regulators. Customers of digital systems continue maturing aware-
ness of the risks associated with the mishandling of and the mali-
cious access to their private information. Such risks include loss of
competitiveness, financial loss, brand erosion, identity theft, and
more profoundly human rights violations. Moreover, the expec-
tation for AI inference systems to become integral parts of mod-
ern digital systems and the lack of understanding of how some
AI models operate further exacerbate customers’ concerns. Insti-
tutions aim to capitalize on building more accurate AI inference
systems from shared data belonging to multiple stakeholders, to
provide better services to their customers, including end users [5].
The leading technology companies improve the effectiveness of
their platform recommendation systems by embedding their cus-
tomers’ preference patterns in sophisticated AI models [1]. Such
models are part of inference systems to deploy and operate in the
cloud, in the core network, on devices, or a mixture thereof. Often,
the raw data processed by such systems can carry private infor-
mation, such as gender, location, political views, to name a few,
and requires privacy protection at any time [3]. Simultaneously,
the AI model and its coefficients (e.g., weights and biases) often
require IP protection. Institutions are also aware of the regulatory
and legal risks associated with mishandling private data and data
breaches [35, 47]. Regulators create and enact regulations to pro-
tect the rights of customers and customers of customers. The en-
forcement of such privacy-related regulations (e.g., the EuropeanGDPR
in the EU, CCPA [4], and the HIPAA [2] in the US) have already
resulted in substantial fines to institutions starting in 2019 1.
At a microscopic level, trends in AI and Privacy influence the
way researchers and technologists think about privacy technolo-
gies in the context of the complex interaction between customers,
institutions, and regulations. Designing technologies to protect data
confidentiality at any time in the data lifecycle is not a new con-
cept. In the 1990s, Ann Cavoukian introduced the concept and prin-
ciples of privacy by design that requires end-to-end data protec-
tion, which includes the protection of data in use (including the
input, the intermediate data, and the output of a computation) [61].
Privacy-enhancing cryptographic techniques, such as securemulti-
party computation or homomorphic encryption, can protect data
in use in alignment with the data privacy regulations (e.g., GDPR).
However, such methods are not yet widely adopted mainly due to
their programming complexity and computational overhead com-
pared to insecure native applications. The renewed awareness of
customers’ risks with data digitization and AI, and the expectation
of AI to play in the global economy in the foreseeable future [8],
have accelerated industry and academic researchers’ efforts to ad-
vance privacy-enhancing cryptographic techniques towards the re-
alization of broader market adoption and application [6].
There resides complex infrastructures in-between themicro- and
macroscopic levels, comprising the cloud, the end devices, and base
stations, that abstract computation, storage, and communication
resources. Such infrastructures represent the contact point between
customers, institutions, regulations, and AI systems. The infras-
tructures are also where a sustainable deployment of trustworthy
1As a consequence of data breaches, British Airways PLC received a fine
of GBP 183M [35], Facebook received a fine of USD 5B [47], to name a few.
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AI inference systems is needed to address themainstream concerns
associated with data privacy and IP protection.
Deployment and Operation. Deploying and operating trust-
worthy AI inference systems is challenging. In its most straight-
forward instance, an AI inference system captures the interactions
in a party of three players. The players are (i) the customer, who
own the input data to an AI service; (ii) the service provider, who
owns, deploys, and operates the AI inference service; and (iii) the
infrastructure provider (e.g., a cloud provider, a network operator).
Such parties are mutually distrustful, can collude, and can be
malicious while aiming for different goals. The AI inference ser-
vice, often an IP owned (either created or acquired) by the service
provider, needs to be protected from the infrastructure provider
and the customer. The customer’s input data may carry privacy-
sensitive information (e.g., in the case of medical records), and re-
quires protection fromboth the service and infrastructure providers.
Furthermore, if the providers experience security breaches, the in-
put data, the intermediate results, and the computation’s output
should remain confidential. Finally, the infrastructure provider re-
quires protection from both the service provider and the customer.
Security Mechanisms (TEE). Approaching the challenge of
deploying and operating trustworthy AI systems in its entirety re-
quires thinking beyond traditional security mechanisms for confi-
dentiality, integrity, and IP protection such as a Trusted Execution
Environment (TEE). TEEs allow protecting the service provider’s
data at rest with encrypted storage, input data in transit with se-
cure channels, and the software, the intermediate data and outputs
from the infrastructure provider. However, the input, intermediate,
and output data (data in use) appear in the clear in the TEE. Protec-
tion of data in use should be seen at its core through the lens of the
social relationship governing disclosure between and among the
customer and the service provider via the platforms that collect,
analyze, and manipulate information for some purpose, without
necessarily requiring parties to trust each other fundamentally. Oc-
casionally, offering TEE protection to customers’ data can be suffi-
cient, but it is not sufficient in the general case. It is paramount to
provide service providers’ access to customers’ data for processing
purposes, while not revealing the data to the processing party.
Advanced Cryptographic Techniques (MPC + HE). To pro-
vide service providers’ access to customers’ data, while not reveal-
ing the data to the processing party, and to protect customers’ data
even in the presence of data breaches at the service or infrastruc-
ture provider, technologists can resort to advanced cryptographic
techniques. For example, secure Multi-Party Computation (MPC)
and Homomorphic Encryption (HE) enable computation on pri-
vate data without ever having plaintext access. The absence of
having the corresponding decryption information enhances cus-
tomers’ data protection even in case of data breaches. Fortunately,
there has been an explosion of innovation in advanced cryptographic
techniques for computing on encrypted data in recent years. Such
innovation promise to lower technology barriers currently hinder-
ing corporations in adopting the said technologies within existing
workflows. Proofs-of-concept have appeared in the context of AI
inference, specifically in Deep Learning (DL)[16, 18, 51, 67, 75].
Hybrid Solutions. Hence, while it is foreseeable for such tech-
niques to percolate into technology, technologists must bear in
mind that the development, deployment, and operation of an AI in-
ference system must protect customers’ data at any time, and too
the security of the AI service and the infrastructure. Technology
providers should foresee a future in which the technology deploys
symbiotic combinations of current system security practices and
advanced cryptographic techniques to build secure, private, and
trustworthy AI inference systems.
2 TAIL AND HEADWINDS
In this section, we highlight catalysts and challenges for the real-
world deployment of trustworthy AI inference systems. The dis-
cussion articulates the elements of an AI inference system, roughly
organized in the following categories: application, software, infras-
tructure, and hardware.
Application. In the application category, vision and specifically
face recognition technologies are mainstream. In the private sec-
tor, one of the most impactful events for business innovation is
the approval and adoption of AI for medical and diagnostic appli-
cations (e.g., the FDA green-lighting AI-as-a-medical-device [48]).
Additionally, early commercial applications are taking off in secu-
rity, retail, and consumer electronics, in which face recognition is
quickly becoming a dominant form of biometric authentication. In
the public sector, however, there is strong opposition for the de-
ployment of face recognition technologies for surveillance-related
applications, as indicated by the slowdown of the US Department
of Homeland Security projects [111]. Even Amazon.com, Inc., Mi-
crosoft, and International Business Machine Corp. (IBM) recently
decided to hold off the commercialization of their face recognition
technologies due to privacy and other societal concerns [23]. Even
though it is clear that the ability to compute on encrypted data
should be technically sufficient to address the privacy concerns,
meaningful adoption of cryptographic privacy technologies needs
other developments than just technology. In particular, both cus-
tomers and institutions must have a thorough understanding of
privacy technologies via educational paths, and agreements on the
use of such technologies via the establishment of standards and
best practices.
Software. In the software level category, the barrier to entry for
the AI space is lower than ever, thanks to open-source software.
Following TensorFlow, major big-tech players have made avail-
able various front-end frameworks for developers to choose from,
including Keras, and Apache® MXNet. Additionally, middle-end
and back-end optimizing frameworks (e.g., Apache® TVM, Intel™
nGraph, OpenVino®, and PlaidML [99]) were developed to facili-
tate the optimization of graph computation and their mapping on
a variety of hardware targets such as CPU, GPU, and FPGA. The
software level exhibits the path of least resistance in percolating
privacy technologies in AI systems, as illustrated by the appear-
ance of proofs-of-concept in the literature the past few years [16,
18, 37, 75].
Infrastructure. In the infrastructure category, the need for real-
time decision making is pushing AI closer to the edge, from the
core network to demarcation points and down to end devices. This
trend gives devices the ability to process information locally and re-
spond faster. Furthermore, the data remains in proximity or mostly
close to the data owner, which inherently helps with privacy. Even
2
Trustworthy AI Inference Systems: An Industry Research View
so, in the presence of stolen devices, and data breaches, it would be
desirable to lift higher the bar of data confidentiality with privacy-
enhancing cryptographic techniques.
Hardware. In the hardware category, many players in the semi-
conductor industry and startups are focused on building chips ex-
clusively for AI workloads. It is noteworthy that semiconductor
players use specialized hardware and native data type specializa-
tion to fit in hardware constraints and reach adequate performance
by trading efficiency, accuracy, and speed. However, the sway in
the trade-off is domain-specific and application dependent. For ex-
ample, in the case of face recognition to unlock devices, the com-
putation needs to fit within tenths of a millisecond. Accuracy is
essential, but a delay in response hinders usability. In other cases,
such as medical diagnosis, speed is relatively not critical. However,
a lack of accuracy can have fatal consequences for the customers,
leading customers to lose trust. Similarly, both high-accuracy and
timeliness are required in predicting an evacuation window given
an expanding fire.
Hardware-assisted technologies such as TEE have existed for a
long time to protect proprietary software IPs. Solutions exist to pro-
tect AI models from the infrastructure hosting the accelerator [50].
Introducing hardware aids for advanced cryptographic techniques
remains challenging. Such techniques often rely on data types for
which mainstream devices are not designed for (e.g., high-degree
polynomials with large coefficients in the case of homomorphic en-
cryption). There is also a lack of standardization of TEE architec-
tures making programming difficult. The design of new standard-
ized hardware for privacy-enhancing cryptographic techniqueswould
be a game changer [60, 88, 91]. Making such techniques inexpen-
sive would create opportunities inconceivable with current soft-
ware implementations optimized for existing hardware targets.
3 PRIVACY TECHNOLOGIES PENETRATION
Including privacy technologies into different facets of AI systems
via security mechanisms and advanced cryptographic techniques
has been an active field of research in recent years. Most research
focuses onmachine learning (ML) tasks, providing accurate privacy-
preserving classification using artificial, specifically convolutional
neural networks. In Machine Learning-as-a-Service (MLaaS), of-
fered by all major cloud service providers, privacy technologies
can allow clients to issue classification queries without revealing
the potentially sensitive information that should be classified in
the clear. In some cases, both model coefficients (weights and bi-
ases) and the functional form of the service providers’ model are
hidden from clients. They represent intellectual property (IP) and
might contain traces of sensitive training data. In other cases, only
the query to the model is protected.
TEE. Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) architectures such
as Intel® Software Guard eXtensions (SGX), ARM® TrustZone®,
and Sanctuary [22], to name a few, are hardware-assisted security
architectures that create a level of security and trust that goes be-
yond the protection capabilities of commodity Operating Systems
(OS).
Solutions that use TEEs alone [15, 21, 106] can protect the IP
and are often the most efficient since many TEE implementations
work at the native speed of the CPU. However, the software within
the TEE processes the input data (or query), produces intermediate
results and outputs in the clear. There exist practical cases where
protection via a TEE cannot be enforced. In such cases, other tech-
niques such as proof of ownership [95] can be used to provide ev-
idence that a service has been counterfeited and that illegitimate
uses of the service occurred.
MPC. Securemulti-party computation (MPC) protocols [52, 116]
are cryptographic protocols that allow multiple parties to jointly
compute a publicly known function on their private inputs while
revealing no information other than the result of the computation.
Therefore, MPC emulates a trusted third party’s behavior within
a provably secure cryptographic protocol without the need to rely
on such a trusted third party.
In solutions that useMPC protocols alone, the participants learn
the architecture of the trained AI model. MPC solutions protect
both the query to the model and the model coefficients, but not the
functional form of themodel. Furthermore, when the model owner
does not own the computational infrastructure (e.g., the model
owner serves the model via a cloud provider), the service deploy-
ment must resort to a trusted execution environment (TEE). The
TEE protects the model coefficients and allows the model owner to
outsource the model coefficients to multiple non-colluding parties
that run MPC [68].
Hiding even the architecture of the AI model with MPC tech-
niques is possible by using so-called universal circuits that can be
programmed by the service provider to emulate any function up to
a given size [9, 54, 71, 73, 97, 108, 118]. Securely evaluating such a
universal circuit with an MPC protocol results in private function
evaluation (PFE), where the function is kept private. However, uni-
versal circuits have an inevitable logarithmic overhead [108] and
therefore are not suitable for huge functions that occur in machine
learning applications.
HE.Homomorphic Encryption (HE) is a potent tool to preserve
the privacy of data and users. An encryption scheme that has ho-
momorphic properties enables computations on encrypted data.
Anyone can perform computations over a ciphertext without the
need to perform decryption. In practice, only limited computation
on encrypted data is feasible today, creating a challenge for finding
AI model architectures that are compatible with these limitations.
HE could allow IP protection inherently when using Fully Ho-
momorphic Encryption (FHE) constructions [19, 32, 43, 46, 49]. Due
to the bootstrapping procedure to refresh ciphertexts noise, the pa-
rameter selection to instantiate an FHE schema can become inde-
pendent from the complexity of the function to evaluate. Hence,
only the party performing the inference learns (knows) the model.
If such a party is the cloud provider (e.g., AI serviced via Google’s
or Microsoft’s infrastructure), the model can be protected with the
security schemes used to protect the cloud infrastructure and its
services. If the party owning the model serves the model via a
cloud infrastructure, the deployment will utilize a TEE to protect
the model from the cloud infrastructure. In either case, fully homo-
morphic encryption methods can evaluate the model in the clear
on encrypted queries while allowing computation on encrypted
data owned by two (or more) distrusted parties. However, such so-
lutions lack mature implementations and performance evaluation.
DP. Differential privacy (DP) [45] is a statistical notion of pri-
vacy where the goal is to protect the privacy of individuals in the
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training data from an adversary who sees the trained model. Pri-
vacy is guaranteed by ensuring that the participation of a single
person in the training data does not change the probability of any
outcome by much. This implies that an adversary who sees the
output of a differentially private algorithm cannot make any infer-
ences about a person in the training data with high confidence that
they could notmake if this person had not been in the training data
at all.
In machine learning, differential privacy is provided by adding
noise to during the training process. Noise can be added in several
ways – to the data itself, to a classifier built on the data [29, 96],
or to a loss function or objective [29]. Currently the most com-
mon method for differentially private machine learning is to add
noise at each iteration of a stochastic gradient descent process dur-
ing training [7, 13, 100]. This provides good privacy, but the added
noise results in a loss of statistical efficiency – measured by model
quality per sample size. Model quality can be measured by classi-
fication accuracy (for classification models) or test log-likelihood
(for generative models), and usually the loss of quality due to pri-
vacy is lower when a large amount of training data is present.
While much progress has been made in the past several years, en-
suring high statistical efficiency remains a central research prob-
lem in differentially private machine learning.
Hybrid Solutions. In addition to the protection profile, there
are performance considerations that call for hybrid solutions that
realize privacy-, security, and ultimately trustworthiness-preserving
building blocks. A straightforward implementation of suchAI tasks
with advanced cryptographic techniques only most likely will not
result in practical solutions in terms of latency, throughput, and
costs for computation power or network traffic in real-world ap-
plications. For example, there are known lower bounds in tradi-
tional computation and security models (e.g., at least two cipher-
texts must be transferred for each AND gate in Yao’s garbled cir-
cuits MPC protocol [117]).
Hence, alternative hybrid approaches may be required to make
privacy preserving MLaaS practically viable. Examples are the de-
velopment of more efficient sub-protocols for specific tasks (e.g.,
matrix multiplication), data and network pre-processing, combina-
tions of MPC protocols with HE or TEEs, optimized mixing of dif-
ferent MPC protocols, and targeting more realistic and practical
security models and security levels.
ModernMPC protocols are a noteworthy example of hybrid pro-
tocols. Today’s most efficient MPC protocols are hybrid protocols
that combine different MPC protocols and potentially also HE for
different sub-tasks [39, 55, 84, 94]. There is also compiler support
for automation [25, 28, 65]. This results in highly efficient proto-
cols for private AI (e.g., for deep neural networks) [12, 16, 67, 78,
83, 85, 92–95], for decision trees [11, 12, 70], and for new machine
learning models such as Hyperdimensional computing [63]. How-
ever, most of the prior art provides solutions that are not yet easy-
to-use by data scientists and have mostly been demonstrated on
simple deep neural networks and small to medium datasets (e.g.,
MNIST [76] or CIFAR-10 [74]). In comparison to advanced cryp-
tographic techniques, TEE architectures provide several orders of
magnitude better performance when used for protecting AI sys-
tems [50, 106]. Furthermore, TEE architectures can be used to alle-
viate overheads introduced by advanced cryptographic techniques.
For example, in [109], a TEE, specifically Intel® SGX, was used to
obviate the severe overhead in the software when performing boot-
strapping in FHE. The usage of a TEE architecture always requires
some trust in the TEE provider. However, it is worth noting that
trusting the TEE provider is a practice that is well established in
the semiconductor industry to protect third party IP [26].
4 ECOSYSTEM DEVELOPMENT
Although there have been significant advances from the ongoing
effort of academic, industry, and government research groups, fur-
ther research and development efforts are needed to realize amean-
ingful commercial adoption of trustworthy AI inference systems.
For example, none of the privacy-preserving techniques (building
blocks) presented above are easy to program, not to mention prov-
ing the security of finalized systems.
Compilers. BothMPC and HE library developers have recently
experimented with automation tools, specific compilers, and opti-
mizers, to help developers build correct and performing solutions
with such libraries. For MPC, such tools have been available for
a while [39, 55, 81], including projects where tools designed for
hardware development have been re-purposed to optimize accord-
ing to the cost models for encrypted "gates" [101]. For example,
CHET [38] is a framework optimized explicitly for neural network
inferencing. EVA [37] builds on CHET and adds a more general-
purpose compiler for a specific HE scheme. Other projects [31, 37,
38, 84] provide frameworks for targeting multiple library backends,
providing a high-level unified Intermediate Representation (IR) or
Application Programming Interface (API). While promising, these
tools are far from being mature, and mostly target advanced cryp-
tographic techniques in the same building block family (e.g., MPC
or HE).
Complex applications. Mapping complex applications onto
advanced cryptographic techniques is still an ad hoc process and
require almost always cryptographic expertise to be done correctly.
In the case of DL workloads, much of the literature shows that
solutions with advanced cryptographic techniques can be hand-
crafted, but only recent work has started to show the execution
of full DL workloads. Frameworks such as Intel® nGraph-HE [16–
18], TF-Encrypted [36], and CrypTFlow [75] allow seamless execu-
tion of pre-built neural networks on HE and MPC building blocks.
CryptoSPN [107] uses sum-product networks (SPNs) for private in-
ference and is integrated with an ML toolchain. The literature has
focused on cases in which the service provider is also the owner
of the infrastructure. In this case, the data owner also trains and
owns the model. As new business models shift towards decentral-
izing the roles of the various owners in the lifecycle of AI sys-
tems, designing more complex system architectures becomes nec-
essary, specifically combining TEEs and advanced cryptographic
techniques. By themselves, most TEEs are also not easy to program.
Fortunately, research programs such as Graphene [53], a joint ef-
fort between Intel and academic partners, provides a solution to
program SGX enclaves seamlessly and securely.
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5 RESEARCH AND STANDARDS
The trend of privacy research and technology development will
continue to mature current technologies ready for mass deploy-
ment. We consider hybrid solutions as viable to build trustworthy
AI systems from a technology standpoint. Such solutions open op-
portunities to sustain the required system performance while pre-
serving security and privacy properties. With the progress made
so far, there are many areas of opportunities for further innovation
developments and addressing challenges for reaching meaningful
adoption.
Decomposition. At a fundamental level, methods appearing
in the literature are tied to specific ML workloads, typically DL
prototype networks. Thus, there is a lack of a broad understanding
of how to decompose an ML workload onto a set of cryptographic
mechanisms for security, data privacy, performance, and energy
efficiency. Filling this knowledge gap becomes essential because
new ideas and advances in ML are being proposed and adopted
regularly, and the fact that privacy-preserving building blocks are
aggressively introduced and refined.
Integration. There is a need and opportunity to increase the
integration of privacy-preserving building blocks in established
ML development tools such as ML frameworks and graph compil-
ers. For example, Intel® nGraph-HE-ABY [16] is the only industry-
class and open-source framework supporting both HE and MPC.
Beyond the integration of building blocks, such a (developmen-
t/testing) framework should also include automatic mechanisms
to map ML workloads onto combinations of privacy-preserving
building blocks for data privacy (e.g., HE versus MPC variants) and
performance objectives. Additionally, it should be easy to incorpo-
rate new mechanisms as advances in privacy technologies appear
in the literature.
Deployment. There is also a need and opportunity to develop
run-time frameworks that can reason about the available resources
in terms of computation, storage, communication and security re-
quirements, to automatically and expediently orchestrate thework-
load component for achieving the execution objectives efficiently.
This is particularly important due to the additional resource de-
mand imposed with the adoption of modern privacy-preserving
mechanisms and their parameter selection options.
Benchmarks. There is also a need for benchmarks. At the time
of writing, the only available benchmark to compare results from
prior art under the same security privacy assumptions still seems
to be limited to CryptoNets [51]. A critical mass of experiments
across AI and other tasks are required at a sufficient scale to draw
conclusions that can drive technology and best practices develop-
ment, transfer and adoption.
Hardware. There is a need for new hardware. It is paramount to
design a programmable processor that provides end-to-end data se-
curity and privacy. Althoughnew processor technologyhas evolved
to serve complex encryption tasks more efficiently, data movement
costs between the processor and memory still hinder the higher
efficiency of applications relying on advanced cryptographic tech-
niques for privacy protection [62, 98]. To address this issue, ac-
tive research in industry and academia need to focus on design-
ing of novel architectures, including but not limited to non-von
Neumann compute architectures such as in-memory or near-data
computing [10, 88].
Standardization. Finally, there is also a need for the develop-
ment of global standards and best practices such as definitions,
technical foundations and application standards to facilitate the
broad deployment of advanced cryptographicmechanisms [24]. In-
ternational standards work under ISO/IEC JTC 1 Information Secu-
rity includes privacy technologies for trustworthy AI systems [86,
89], and early-stage standardization on secure multi-party compu-
tation and fully homomorphic encryption techniques.
Provenance. Integrity and security of AI systems is required
for validating privacy requirements. Immutable ledgers for data
authenticity, trusted electronic supply chains, and verified neural
networks for AI inference systems provide necessary trust to en-
able wide distribution of the technology. There is a need for ac-
tive research in integrating technologies like blockchain and dis-
tributed ledger technology into AI systems to ensure provenance
and integrity throughout the manufacturing and lifecycle of the
AI system components and to ensure privacy preserving require-
ments are met [82, 114].
Fault Resiliency. AI models are vulnerable to various types
of faults, such as permanent stuck-at defects, random bit-flip, and
thermal noise [72, 104], which makes reliability critical issues in
AI hardware. Both device aging and malicious activities can con-
tribute to such reliability issues. Circuit vulnerabilities can be lever-
aged by attackers to intentionally cause the hardware to fail under
a variety of attack vectors, including row hammer, bit-flip, gra-
dient descent, and backdoor attacks [33, 34, 56, 80, 90, 102]. Al-
though recent work has investigated errors in AI models [30, 59,
77, 112, 112, 113, 113], they mostly focus on tolerating manufac-
turing defects and overlook errors caused by device aging or mali-
cious intent. Such solutions also require non-trivial retraining and
data/hardware redundancy, limiting their applicability to edge de-
vices with tight hardware budget and limited training capability.
Hence, to monitor and maintain reliability and trustworthiness of
AI accelerators, it is desirable to develop self-test and self-healing
techniques that integrates test, diagnosis, and recovery loops into
the system. Such techniques should target both hard defects and
soft errors. They should perform a non-destructive self-test peri-
odically to detect errors and pinpoint defective cells if any. Upon
detecting any error-induced accuracy loss, such techniques should
offer a retraining-free self-healing process to rescue the AI model’s
accuracy. The interaction of such techniques and privacy technolo-
gies is an open topic of research.
Side-Channel Resiliency. Although black-box model extrac-
tion techniques [66, 105] are ever-evolving by adopting the crypt-
analytic methods [27], they are still economically infeasible, since
they need millions of queries to steal a model with high fidelity.
Side-channel analysis on inference systems [14, 40–42, 44, 57, 58,
79, 87, 103, 110, 115], by contrast, can succeed with significantly
fewer tests and are harder to prevent as we learned from the re-
search on cryptographic engineering. Side-channel analysis can
steal both the input data of the customer [110] and themodel of the
service provider [14], the general architecture of the deployed AI
system [79] and the detailed, bit-level values of its coefficients [41].
The defenses against digital side-channels, such as timing side-
channels, are relatively more natural to establish for specialized
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accelerators (as opposed to general-purpose engines) because the
design tools enable cycle-accurate control and simulation. Build-
ing defenses to prevent physical side-channel leakages such as via
power consumption or electromagnetic radiation is challenging
and needs tuning for the specifics of the target algorithm and its
underlying implementation. Recent research has shown the first
proofs-of-concept by extending the techniques from cryptographic
engineering and empirically validating the physical side-channel
security [41, 42]. Further research is needed to achieve provably-
secure, composable, and low-cost solutions that can be deployed
in real-world applications of trustworthy AI systems. However,
such research is unlikely to occur without significant investment,
given that it is still a challenge for cryptographic systems after two
decades of work. One way to accelerate the process is government
involvement in standardizing the defenses [20].
6 PRIVACY AND EXPLAINABILITY
The performance of AI models depend on the quality of the train-
ing data. Training datasets with inherent bias lead to models repli-
cating that bias, sometimes resulting in positive feedback loops
where biased decisions are made based on decisions from biased
models, creatingmore biased data that themodels are further trained
on. Many MLmodels, such as DNNs, are poorly explainable (i.e., it
is hard to explain post-hoc what contributed to a specific incorrect
or biased prediction). It can be hard to understand howwell, or how
poorly, the model will behave on unexpected inputs. Privacy tech-
nologies can further complicate this situation: if the model owners
cannot see the query or the result, they have little hope of detect-
ing incorrect or biased predictions, possibly thwarting good inten-
tions to produce fair and unbiased ML applications. Novel strate-
gies, such as Hyperdimensional computing, show promise in sup-
porting secure and private computation while being explainable
and easily updateable online [64, 69].
7 CONCLUSION
In this work, we identify vehicles to percolate privacy technolo-
gies in AI inference systems, such as open-source frameworks, in-
frastructure, and hardware design. We foresee architectural solu-
tions, including hybrid methods with security mechanisms and ad-
vanced cryptographic techniques as viable innovations for design-
ing, building, deploying and operating AI inference systems.
The challenge of enabling seamless, private, and secure access
to data without disrupting the existing AI ecosystem and lifecycle
is open, and offers a fertile space for privacy technologies and the
development of their use cases in fields such as healthcare, finance,
and retail, to name a few. Such developments can also be applied
to private computing applications and are not limited to AI and
specifically deep learning.
We hope that the attention to the field continues fostering pro-
ductive partnerships in the foreseeable future to address some of
the challenges above and bring a future where the use of AI tech-
nology is safe and private to fully realize the anticipated benefits
of AI to societies and humanity worldwide.
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